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Abstract
Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent prin-
cipal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of
the rms (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mecha-
nism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information
to the principal to share the gains of collusion with the rm. The
novelty of this paper is that both the regulatory mechanism and the
side contracting between the agency and the rm are modelled as a
bargaining process. While as usual the ine¢ cient rm does not have
any interest in cost manipulation, we nd that the e¢ cient rm has
an incentive to collude only if the agencys bargaining power is high
enough, and the total gains of collusion are now lower than those the
two partners would appropriate if the agency could make a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er. Then, we focus on the optimal institutional responses
to the possibility of collusion. In our setting, where the incomplete-
ness of contracts prevents the principal from designing of a screening
mechanism and thus Tiroles equivalence principle does not apply, we
show how the playersbargaining powers crucially drive the optimal
response to collusion.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of collusion in the regu-
lation of a monopolistic market when a benevolent principal delegates to a
regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the rms (two-type) costs
and the negotiation with the rm over a pricing policy. In this new setting
we investigate the classic questions: which regulatory policy should we ex-
pect in such a situation? What are the characteristics of the collusive gains?
Which is the best response to collusion? What are the determinants of this
response? This paper is a rst attempt to derive some preliminary results
within this general setting.
We consider a standard model of a three-tier regulatory hierarchy, where
the political principal (Congress) directs the activities of a supervisor (the
regulatory agency), which in turn oversees the operation of a monopoly (the
regulated rm). We innovate the usual approach assuming that the principal
delegates to the supervisor a general negotiation with the monopolist on the
regulatory policy. The reason for this generalization is that usually regulation
does not boil down to a passive enforcement of a policy, but actually involves
a negotiation between the regulator and the rm. In other words, regulatory
arrangements are generally the result of a give-and-take process rather than of
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, since the possibility of pre-committing to a specic
o¤er is actually unrealistic. Another important issue to analyse would be
the bargaining process between the political principal and the regulatory
agency, but we limit the scope of this paper within the negotiation between
the agency and the rm.
The literature on regulation has long ago recognized the relevance of
introducing general bargaining processes in the interaction between regula-
tor and rm. For example, Kahn (1971) had already observed that often
public utilities represent cases of bilateral monopolies, while Spulber (1989)
proposed regulatory models dealing with bargaining processes. Similarly,
Scarpas (1989, 1994) work represents a preliminary attempt to model this
aspect of regulatory situations. Finally, Armstrong and Sappington in their
survey on optimal regulation have recently recognized that the standard for-
mulation, which ignores negotiations between the regulator and the rm,
generally is adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism
(2007, p. 1564). Also empirical studies support this idea. Among others,
Brotman (1987) reported that negotiations with private rms are a normal
way to decide on industry regulation.
In our model a benevolent Congress (interested in the consumer surplus)
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delegates to a regulatory agency1 two activities: a supervisory job and a
bargaining task.2 Therefore, the regulator is not only a mere conduit of in-
formation about the rms costs, but it carries out the additional task of
negotiating a regulatory settlement with the rm. Congress delegates the
full contracting authority to the regulator since it lacks nancial resources,
skills or expertise to run this task.3 As usual in collusion models, the agency
cannot be trusted to perfectly enforce Congresss intent because it may be
self-interested and thus have an incentive to collude with the rm by ma-
nipulating its information to Congress in return of a side transfer from the
rm.4 However, di¤erently from standard models, side contracting between
the agency and the rm is considered as a bargaining process parallel to the
negotiations over the regulatory mechanism. The two bargaining stages are
modelled using the Nash solution concept (1950, 1953), which we argue is
the most e¤ective way to deal with our view.
Our analysis shows how standard results are altered by these two bar-
gaining processes. This does not mean at all that the approach in this paper
contradicts the classic one. Our setup turns out to be a generalization of the
standard model, which represents the specic case where all the bargaining
power is allocated to the agency.
In absence of collusion (Section 3), the regulatory mechanism agreed by
the agency and the rm maximizes the total gains from trade, which are
shared between players according to their bargaining power. However, the
introduction of negotiation between the regulator and the monopoly induces
a radical change in the collusion stage. While the ine¢ cient rm as usual does
not have any interest in cost manipulation, we nd that the e¢ cient rm has
an incentive to collude only if it is su¢ ciently weak in the bargaining process.
Interestingly, collusion pays o¤ when the rms revenue from a higher price
more than compensates the lower subsidization. Since the latter reduces
1We take Tiroles (1986) assumption of unique regulator, which may be justied either
by a cost of duplication of the regulatory function or by collusive behaviour between
regulators.
2As in La¤ont and Tirole (1990), we assume that regulatory institutions result from
a constitution drafted by some benevolent "founding fathers" or "social planners", which
may be identied with Congress. The latter delegates some activities to a public decision
maker, which is represented by a regulatory agency.
3It seems natural to assume that a legislative assembly does not have the right skills
to contract directly with the rm. Of course, this does not mean that full delegation
is optimal. The characterization of the conditions under which this is the case is a very
stimulating topic, but it is outside the scope of this paper. See on this issue the contribution
of Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003).
4Tirole stresses the importance of reciprocity in the side contracting and states that
one-sided favors call for reciprocated ones (1986, p. 185).
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with the agencys bargaining power, this can be the case only if the agency
is strong enough. If the latter could make a standard take-it-or-leave-it o¤er,
the total gains of collusion would be maximized. This implies that bargaining
mitigates the incentive to collude.
In the second part of the paper (Section 4), we focus on the optimal orga-
nizational responses to the possibility of collusion. The well-known Tiroles
(1986) equivalence principle predicts that, under some conditions, deterring
collusion through appropriate incentives is always optimal in equilibrium. In
our setting, incompleteness of contracts arising from institutional constraints
prevents Congress from devising a mechanism which perfectly discriminates
between the agencys types, and thus the equivalence principle does not ap-
ply.5 We assume that Congress can use one of the following three instru-
ments: an incentive reward to the agency, the shutdown of the ine¢ cient
rm (of course both intended to deter collusion), or tolerating collusion tout
court. As long as the probability of facing the e¢ cient rm is low enough
and thus the shutdown policy is not convenient, Congress nds it optimal to
tolerate collusion in equilibrium if the cost of the incentive reward which in-
duces the agency not to collude outweighs the expected consumer loss from
collusion. In other terms, collusion is optimal when tolerating this possi-
bility is less costly than deterring it. We explore this condition and show
that the playersbargaining powers crucially drive the optimal response to
collusion. Interestingly, we nd that preventing collusion is optimal if the
agencys bargaining power is below a certain threshold. A stronger agency
improves Congresss incentives to tolerate collusion in equilibrium. The idea
is that such an agency can exact a higher bribe from the rm and thus the
incentive reward for not colluding is more expensive. In other terms, a high
bargaining power of the agency in the negotiation process can make collusion
too costly to ght.
On the other hand, when the probability of facing the e¢ cient rm is
su¢ ciently high, the shutdown policy may become a valuable option. In this
case, Congress never nds it optimal to tolerate collusion and prefers to ght
it either by giving the agency an incentive reward or by shutting down the
ine¢ cient rm. The latter policy outperforms the former when the agency
is strong enough in the bargaining process. This occurs since the expected
benet of allowing the ine¢ cient rm to produce is lower than the incentive
reward for not colluding.
Clearly these results suggest that the playersbargaining powers in regu-
latory relationships should deserve careful consideration, since they crucially
drive the potential for collusion. The arbitrary limitation to model with all
5See Tirole (1992), Kofman and Lawarrée (1996).
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the bargaining power allocated to the regulatory agency may neglect inter-
esting institutional regulatory mechanisms as endogenous best responses to
the possibility of collusion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic
structures of the model. Section 3 considers the case where collusion is freely
possible: in Subsection 3.1 we derive the regulatory policy with a benevolent
agency, while Subsection 3.2 analyses the case of a nonbenevolent agency.
In Section 4 we characterize the optimal institutional responses to collusion.




Congress is a benevolent principal concerned with consumer surplus only. It
hires a regulator which supervises the rms unknown marginal costs and
bargains with the rm over the regulatory mechanism. Full delegation of
contracting authority arises from Congresss lack of time, skills or resources
to run this task. Congresss problem is to o¤er a delegation contract that
considers both roles of the regulatory agency and provides the compensation
TCS  0 for the supervision and the negotiation over a regulatory policy.
The consumers buy a quantity q (p) for the good and pay a two-part tari¤,
characterized by a unit price p and a xed amount S. Consumer surplus is
equal to the benet from the marketplace net of the aggregate xed charges
S6 minus the transfer to the agency TCS, collected through distortionary








q (po) dpo   S   (1 + )TCS.
For the sake of convenience, consumer demand is supposed to depend
linearly on price. Thus, without loss of generality we consider the following
simple expression
q (p) = 1  p
6The xed payment S may be thought of as apportioned among consumers in such a
manner that no consumer is excluded from purchasing the good.
7Our results do not crucially depend on the presence of a (strictly) positive shadow
cost of public funds, which is considered only for the sake of completeness. This implies
that the assumption of non-distortionary xed charges is (qualitatively) inconsequential.
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  S   (1 + )TCS. (1)
2.1.2. The rm
The rms cost function C (:) is a¢ ne:
C (q; ci) = ciq +K,
whereK denotes the xed costs which are assumed to be common knowledge,
while the marginal cost ci, with i 2 fL;Hg, is private information of the
rm. The two cost parameters cL and cH , with c  cH   cL > 0, are drawn
with (common knowledge) probabilities  and (1  ) 2 (0; 1), respectively.
Moreover, we assume that cH < 1 to ensure that production is always rst-
best e¢ cient.
Therefore the ci-type rms prot function is
 (p; S; ci) = pq (p) + S   ciq (p) K. (2)
2.1.3. The regulatory agency
The regulator has a twofold role: supervising the rms unknown marginal
costs and bargaining with the rm over the regulatory mechanism.
There are two types of agency: benevolent and self-interested. The
benevolent regulator, which is drawn with (common knowledge) probabil-
ity  2 (0; 1), always reports truthfully to Congress the signal received from
the surpervisory technology (see below). Moreover, it settles for a transfer
T , needed to nance its activity, equal to its reservation value eT (normalized
to zero) and perfectly internalizes Congresss interests during the bargaining
process with the rm. Therefore, the utility function of a benevolent agency
is
VB = CS. (3)
A self-interested regulator, which occurs with complementary probability
(1  ), has an incentive to forge the informative signal and collude with the
rm (see below). Moreover, it internalizes only partly Congresss interests
and aims to receive a transfer T  eT . The utility function of a nonbenevolent
agency is given by






, with  < 1, is a parameter that captures the regulators
degree of internalization of Congresss objectives. If  = 0, the agency is
only interested in its private transfer.8 A higher  implies that it gives more
weight to Congresss aim.
The supervisory technology is characterized by perfect monitoring, so that
the signal the agency receives is always informative about the rms marginal
costs. However, the signal is supposed to be soft information, and thus it
can be manipulated.9 This means that the regulator may lie and convey a
report r 2 fcL; cHg di¤erent from the actual ci by altering the result of its
audit activity. Manipulating information is the agencys degree of discretion:
it can announce a wrong cost parameter since this report is never veriable.
A benevolent agency always reports r = ci to Congress, while a self-
interested agency has an incentive to declare r 6= ci colluding with the rm.10
2.2. Timing
The timing of the regulatory game is as follows.
1. Nature draws a type - benevolent or nonbenevolent - for the agency
with probability  and (1  ) respectively, and privately informs the
agency. Nature also draws a type for the rm ci 2 fcL; cHg, with
respective probabilities  and (1  ), and privately informs the rm.
2. Congress o¤ers to the agency a contract which determines a transfer
TCS (r)  0 conditional on the report r and delegates the negotiations
with the rm about a regulatory mechanism.
3. The contract is signed or rejected by the agency.
8This is the classic case of perfectly nonbenevolent agency, see La¤ont and Tirole (1991).
9See La¤ont and Rochet (1997) for an analysis of the di¤erence between hard informa-
tion and soft information models.
10It is usually assumed in the literature that the rm observes the agencys signal. This
can be the case if before signing the collusive agreement the agency must disclose to the
rm the signal it has received. We do not need such an assumption because the signal
is always informative and this is common knowledge, hence the rm knows the agencys
signal. However, in line with the literature we need to assume that the agency cannot
forge the signal against the rms will. In other terms, we require that cost manipulation
occur when it is protable for both partners. We can imagine that the rm is able to prove
before Congress its actual costs. This assumption rules out the possibility of blackmail by
the agency in our setting. Khalil and Lawarrée (1995) underline the importance for future




benevolent: VB = CS
nonbenevolent: VNB = T + βCS
Firm: cL or cH
bargaining power: 1 - α
report r payment T
CS
bargain over side transfer TFbargain over (p,S)
Figure 1: Figure 1. The basic structures of the model
4. If the contract is rejected, the game ends. In case of acceptance, the
agency performs its audit activity and receives the informative signal.
The rm learns the agencys type.11
5. Negotiations between the agency and the rm take place on a regulatory
mechanism fp; Sg.
 If it is benevolent, the agency reports r = ci to Congress.
 If it is dishonest, the agency has an incentive to collude with the
rm and manipulate its information, i.e. r 2 fcL; cHg 6= ci. In
this case, they bargain over a side transfer T F (r) as a reward for
the agencys report.
6. Contracts are executed and the regulatory policy is implemented.
Figure 1 summarizes the basic structures of the model.
2.3. Use of the Nash bargaining solution
The novelty of this paper is that the agency negotiates with the rm both on
a regulatory mechanism fp; Sg and on the split in collusion gains when the
11This assumption is made, among others, by Kofman and Lawarrée (1996). The rm
can discover the agencys type when it proposes side contracting. A benevolent agency
would not accept such a proposal, while a dishonest agency can be willing to collude.
Attempted bribery is not punishable, since it is extremely di¢ cult or costly to prove.
Alternatively, the agency can show its type, since it is the party which takes the initiative
to collude.
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agency is dishonest. Therefore we need to consider a model for both these
negotiation processes.
As well known, the outcome of a bargaining game is very sensitive to
all the details of the negotiation process as well as to the delay costs of the
two players, i.e. to all the bargaining protocols. For example, in the simple
one-shot simultaneous o¤er protocol, any outcome is a possible equilibrium
even using strong renement concepts.12 A crucial point in the specication
of a bargaining game is whether the players are assumed to commit to their
actions, thus providing a specic extensive form. Obviously, in many settings
it is di¢ cult to provide a reliable specication of all the possible moves, of
their sequence and of the information available to the players during the play.
Therefore, instead of describing the specic bargaining procedure in full
details, i.e. a specic and therefore arbitrary extensive form, we choose to
characterize the outcome by a more general approach. The driving idea of
this paper is to use the cooperative asymmetric Nash model (1950, 1953).
We believe there are at least ve good reasons to make such a modelling
choice.
1. Its generality allows to avoid the specication of a particular extensive
form structure.
2. The Nash solution is e¢ cient so that our results do not depend on
the unexploited gains from trade in the specic bargaining procedures
which can be considered. This means that our approach might under-
estimate the transaction costs between the colluding parties, but we
capture this aspect with a shadow cost of side transfers (see Section 3).
3. The uniqueness of the Nash solution implies that the principal can
anticipate the outcome of bargaining to determine its optimal reaction,
which is crucial for this kind of collusion models.
4. As we will show, this solution leads to easy calculations but also to
interesting and plausible results.
5. As Spulber (1989, ch. 2) emphasizes, a crucial feature of regulatory
hearing processes is the direct interaction between players which may




Even though there are alternative cooperative concepts such as the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution, for our purposes the asymmetric Nash bargaining so-
lution is probably the most convincing and e¤ective.13
3. Regulation when collusion is tolerated
3.1. The benevolent agency
With probability  a benevolent agency is drawn, which completely internal-
izes Congresss interest in consumer surplus. Hence, Congress would o¤er a
reward TCS = eT  0 to the agency, independently of its report r. As long as
the regulator is benevolent, it transmits its information truthfully and there
is no threat of collusion.




[VB(p (ci) ; S (ci))]
  [(p (ci) ; S (ci))]1  s:t: (5)
VB  0 (PCA)
  0, (PCF )
where the parameters  and (1 ) 2 (0; 1) are respectively the agencys and
the rms bargaining power. Notice that this is independent of the benevo-
lence of the agency. A low  does not mean regulatory capture arising from
collusion, but it denotes the agencys weakness in the bargaining process,
which may stem from limited resources in terms of skills and expertise to
assert its own interests and nd the best compromise with the rm.
The nonnegativity constraints (PCA) and (PCF ) represent the agencys
and rms participation constraints. A benevolent agency is interested in
consumer surplus, which must be nonnegative in order to induce the purchase
of the good. Similarly, the rm cannot accept to produce by making losses.
Hence, also the disagreement payo¤s are zero for both bargaining parties.








[(p (ci)  ci) (1  p (ci)) + S (ci) K]1 
13The Nash solution can be justied using di¤erent extensive form structures. See among
others Binmore and Dasgupta (1987), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Rubinstein (1982).
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(6)
s:t: (PCA), (PCF ):
After replacing the choice variable S with  from (2) into (6), the maxi-






+ (p (ci)  ci) (1  p (ci)) K    (ci)
#
 1 
s:t: (PCA), (PCF ):
Ignoring the constraints,14 from the rst-order condition for p it is imme-
diate to nd that the price agreed by the regulated rm and a benevolent
agency is equal to
p (ci) = ci. (7)
As the Nash bargaining process is e¢ cient, the negotiated regulatory pol-
icy clearly implements the marginal cost pricing, independently of bargaining
powers. The agency and the rm do not have any incentive to distort price
from marginal cost, since both prefer to maximize the total gains from trade.
Not surprisingly, we will see that the rm tries to extract these gains through
the subsidy S:15
From the rst-order condition for  we nd






 (1  )TGT (ci) , (8)
i.e. the prot arising from negotiations is a share (1  ) of the total gains
from trade TGT (ci) for marginal costs ci:16 Clearly, the stronger the agency,
the smaller the prot that the rm can obtain from the regulatory arrange-
ment. Note that, even though the agency is benevolent and does not collude,
the rm gets a prot which is strictly greater than its reservation value,
without any consequence on the allocative e¢ ciency.
14It can be easily shown that they are satised in equilibrium.
15As well known, a monopolist that maximizes its prot subject to a nonnegative con-
sumer surplus constraint sets a price equal to marginal cost and captures all the consumer
gains through the subsidy.
16We assume that the xed costs K are small enough so that total gains from trade are
always positive.
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Substituting (7) and (8) into (2) yields






+K = (1  )TGT (ci) +K, (9)
i.e. the subsidy covers the xed costs K and assigns to the rm a share
(1  ) of the total gains from trade TGT (ci) : Obviously, an increase in
the agencys bargaining power reduces the rms subsidy: very weak agency
(! 0) allows the rm to get a high subsidy, while if all the bargaining power
is allocated to the agency ( ! 1) as in standard principal-agent models,
the rm is hardly able to cover its xed costs through subsidy (S (ci)! K)
and receives no prot.
The consumer surplus is given by






= TGT (ci) , (10)
i.e. it is a share  of the total gains from trade: The positive relation between
 and CS (ci) shows that clearly consumers benet from a strong benevolent
regulator.
We summarize the main results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 If the agency is benevolent, then the negotiated regulatory mech-
anism maximizes total gains from trade, and in particular
 applies marginal cost pricing, i.e. p (ci) = ci
 gives the rm a subsidy S (ci) = (1  )TGT (ci) + K, which is de-
creasing in the agencys bargaining power .
3.2. The self-interested agency
A nonbenevolent agency, which is drawn with probability (1  ), is inter-
ested in consumer surplus and in the private transfer T . This income may
come either from consumers, through the taxes they pay, or from the rm,
which may give a bribe to the agency for the manipulation of the informative
signal.
We assume that Congress tolerates the possibility of collusion. Hence,
Congress continues to o¤er a constant reward TCS = eT to the agency, inde-
pendently of its report r, so that a nonbenevolent regulator has an incentive
to collude with the rm.
A self-interested agency opens the possibility of collusion, since the rm
may have a stake in the agencys report.
12
Proposition 1 Dene e  c
2 cH cL 2 (0; 1) : Then, if  2 (0; e] collusion is
not attractive for any type of rm. If  2 (e; 1) only the cL-type rm has a
stake in collusion  (cH ; cL)   (cH ; cL)   (cL) from report manipulation
which amounts to
 (cH ; cL) = c (1  cH)  (1  ) (TGT (cL)  TGT (cH)) . (11 )
Proof. Using (7), (8) and (9), a report r = cL while the rms true cost is
cH yields an extra prot equal to
 (cL; cH)   (cH) =  
c
2
[ (2  cH   cL) + c] < 0.
The cL-type rms extra gain  (cH ; cL) from forging the agencys report
can be written as
 (cH ; cL) = c (1  cH)  (S (cL)  S (cH)) = c (1  cH)
  (1  ) (TGT (cL)  TGT (cH)) =
c
2
[ (2  cH   cL) c] ,
which is positive if and only if  2 (e; 1), where e is dened in Proposition
1.
While as usual the ine¢ cient rm is never interested in cost manipula-
tion, the e¢ cient rm nds it protable to collude only if it is su¢ ciently
weak, i.e.  2 (e; 1). Note from (11) that collusion pays o¤ only if the ex-
tra gain from a higher market price c (1  cH) more than compensates the
subsidy loss (1  ) (TGT (cL)  TGT (cH)). Interestingly, the stronger the
agency in the bargaining process, the higher the rms extra prot from pure
informational advantage with respect to Congress. This occurs because the
agencys bargaining power reduces the subsidy loss from cost manipulation.
In fact, we know from (9) that a weaker rm can extract a lower subsidiza-
tion. Since the extra gain from a higher market price is independent of the
bargaining power, the stake in collusion increases with a stronger agency.
If the latter could make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er ( ! 1) the total gains
of collusion would be maximized. This means that the bargaining process
mitigates the rms incentives to collude.
In line with the main literature, the side contract between the rm (with
 2 (e; 1)) and the self-interested regulator is supposed to be enforceable,
even though it is illegal.17 According to Stiglers (1971), collusion is driven by
17This assumption is clearly a shortcut since it simply presumes that any gain from trade
between parties is realized. The enforcement of side contracts may actually be assumed to
rely on non-judicial mechanisms, like reputation in long-term relationships or the "word
of honor" in one-shot relationships. Among others, see La¤ont and Tirole (1993, ch. 11)
for a discussion on this issue.
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two crucial factors: the stake in collusion and the organization costs. In our
setting, the stake in collusion is given by the extra prot  (cH ; cL) in (11)
that the cL-type rm can obtain if its private information is altered before
Congress. As Tirole (1992) emphasizes, collusion is likely to be a serious
issue only if information can be manipulated.
The rms costs of organization are represented by transfer costs,18 which
are related to the deadweight loss associated with the side transfer of income
from the rm to the regulator.19 Following La¤ont and Tirole (1991), we
capture this ine¢ ciency by introducing an exogenous shadow cost of side
transfers   0. The idea is that a monetary equivalent of one dollar received
by the agency costs (1 + ) dollars to the rm. This parameter determines
the transaction technology between the rm and the agency. If ! +1, the
transaction technology is so ine¢ cient that no coalition forms. Otherwise,
the transaction technology makes collusion protable. If  = 0 then there is
no deadweight loss from side contracting.
The regulatory arrangement arising from collusive negotiations allows the
cL-type rm to keep its informational advantage over Congress (r = cH)
even though the agency is informed about the rms costs. The side contract
species a covert transfer T F (r)  0, which is paid by the rm to the agency
only if r = cH and costs (1 + )T F (r) to the rm.
We assume that in case of disagreement about the side contract the agency





.20 Thus the solution to this bargaining problem arises from the
maximization of the Nash product of the two partiesgains in utility over






T F ; :

  V DNB
    T F ; :  DNB1  s:t: (12)
VNB  V DNB (PCA)
  DNB (PCF )
18Furthermore, the rm incurs mobilization costs to collect information and intervene
in specic regulatory issues. These costs are ignored in our setting.
19A monetary bribe exposes the parties to the possibility of legal sanctions. Alterna-
tively, the agencys sta¤ values nonmonetary side transfers (for entertainment, jobs after
the tenure in the agency,...) less than the monetary expenses incurred by the rm.
20We follow Tiroles (1986) idea that each party can guarantee itself the no-side-contract
outcome.
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 =  (cL) +  (cH ; cL)  (1 + )T F . (CC )
The last constraint (CC ) indicates the prot of the cL-type rm under
collusion. The rationale is the following. When the collusive agency lies
and reports r = cH , we know from (11) that the rms prot from signal
manipulation is the sum of the rst two addends of (CC ). This represents
the gross earning of the rm from collusion. The rm spends a part of this
gain, equal to (1 + )T F , to pay a side transfer T F to the agency.
We have assumed that, in case of disagreement about the side contract,
the agency and the rm continue to negotiate over the regulatory mechanism.
In this case, we would be in the same setting as in Subsection 3.1 except
for the parameter . The agency would not receive any bribe (T F = 0) and
would reveal the truth to Congress (r = cL), which could save the extraprot
to the rm ( = 0). Hence, the agencys no-collusion utility is equal to the
consumer surplus CS (cL) weighted by  (i.e. V DNB = TGT (cL) from (10)).
The rms no-collusion prot is given by  (cL) (i.e. DNB = (1  )TGT (cL)
from (8)). As from (10) r = cH implies that Congress expects CS (cH), we





T F    (TGT (cL)  TGT (cH))
[   (1  )TGT (cL)]1  s:t:
(13)
(PCA) , (PCF ) , (CC ):
Substituting (CC ) into (13) and ignoring for the moment the other con-




T F   c
2






( (2  cH   cL) c)  (1 + )T F
1 
: (14)
Notice from (14) that the agencys gain V CNB over the no-collusion out-
come, represented by the rst factor in the Nash product, is the side transfer
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from the rm minus the consumer loss weighted by . The rms gain in
collusion C , captured by the second factor of the Nash product, is the dif-
ference between the total stake in collusion  and the expense (1 + )T F
to bribe the agency.
After some manipulations the rst-order condition for T F can be written
as
  (1 + )T F+c
2
 [(2  cH   cL) (+  (1  ) (1 + )) c] = 0: (15)
From (15) in equilibrium the side transfer is given by
T F = 
(2  cH   cL) (+  (1  ) (1 + )) c








 (1  ) (2  cH   cL) : (16)
We emphasize now a result of some relevance.
Proposition 2 Dene b  c
(2 cH cL)[1 (1+)] , with 1    (1 + ) 2 (0; 1].
Then, collusion occurs in equilibrium if and only if  2 (b; 1) when Congress
tolerates this threat.
Proof. Using (16) the two bracketed expressions in (14) are positive if and
only if  2 (b; 1), where b is dened in Proposition 2. This implies that
(PCA) and (PCF ) in (12) are satised.
We nd that b  e (dened in Proposition 1) since the nonbenevolent
agencys degree  of consumer surplus internalization reduces its willingness
to collude. Only if the agency is completely dishonest ( = 0) the incentives
to collude of both players perfectly align, i.e. b = e. Notice that b < 1
as long as  < 2(1 cH)
(1+)(2 cH cL) , i.e. for  low enough. Otherwise, a dishonest
agency will not collude since no bribe can compensate its disutility from lying,
and then there is no di¤erence between the two types of agency. Since we
are interested in the possibility of collusion, we focus hereafter our attention
on the case  < 2(1 cH)
(1+)(2 cH cL) .
A straightforward consequence of our discussion is that the side transfer
T F in (16) increases in . The greater the weight the nonbenevolent agency
attaches to consumer surplus, the higher the amount of side transfer that it
requires to manipulate its information. Hence,  can be thought of as the
inverse of the level of corruptibility of the regulator. An increase in  implies
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more disutility from lying (in terms of consumer surplus loss) and makes the
agency more costly to bribe.
The bribe that the agency can extort from the rm is increasing in its
bargaining power. If ! 0, the regulator does not collect anything (T F ! 0)
since it is too weak. If  ! 1, all the bargaining power is allocated to the










which is just the maximum extra prot that the rm can obtain from the
manipulation of evidence discounted by the shadow cost of side transfers.
Note that the side transfer in (18) approximates the take-it-or-leave-it call
for a bribe taken by the agency which is commonly assumed in collusion
models.21
Not surprisingly, the side transfer to the regulator is decreasing in the
transaction costs of collusion. If  = 0, the side contracting is fully e¢ -
cient and the rm can a¤ord to pay a high bribe. If  ! +1, transaction
technology is so ine¢ cient that collusion is infeasible (T F ! 0).
Using (16), we derive after some computations the extra gains from col-

























 (1 + ) (2  cH   cL)

.
Figure 2 illustrates the patterns of V CNB (thick solid line) and 
C
(thin solid line) as functions of . The di¤erence between the total stake in
collusion  (dashed thin line) and the total stake discounted by the shadow
cost of side transfers 
1+
(dashed thick line) captures the deadweight loss
from side contracting.22
21See, among others, La¤ont (2000, ch. 2).
22The functions depicted in Figure 1 are derived by assuming cL = 0:2, cH = 0:5,
 = 0:5 and  = 0:3.
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Figure 2. Gains from side contracting
Notice that the parameter  introduces a second source of ine¢ ciency in
the collusion process. In fact, a part of the net collusion gains 
1+
directly
nances the share  of the consumer loss internalized by the agency and
constitutes a mere waste of resources in the bribing game. An increase in the
agencys bargaining power reduces the fraction of the total pie appropriated
by the rm, since the agency requires a greater side transfer. Nevertheless,
the rm gets an increasing extra rent from collusion over some range. Hence,
the benet for the rm from an increase in the total stake in collusion induced
by  outweighs the cost of a reduced bargaining power. When the agencys
bargaining power is su¢ ciently high, the trade-o¤ becomes detrimental to
the rm, whose gain from collusion decreases.
4. The institutional responses to collusion
So far we have supposed that Congress tolerates tout court the possibility
of collusion. In this section we characterize the institutional responses that
Congress should devise to give consumers the highest (expected) surplus. We
consider three alternative options:
1. Congress, acting as a Stackelberg leader, deters collusion through an
incentive payment to the agency at least equal to the extra gain which
is anticipated to arise from side contracting,23
2. the ine¢ cient rm is shut down,
3. collusion is tolerated tout court.
23Following La¤ont (2000, ch. 2), we assume that limited liability constraints prevent
Congress from designing a system of punishments and nes against the agency.
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Note that when choosing option 1 Congress is supposed to design an
incentive scheme which applies to both types of the regulator. This assump-
tion is quite common in literature and can be justied by institutional set-
tings that allow compensations contingent to agencys report only. As Ti-
role (1992) suggests, the impossibility of discriminating between the agencys
types may be thought of as Congresss uncertainty about a binary transaction
technology of collusion. Indeed, as shown in Section 4 if  ! +1 the side
contracting is so ine¢ cient to make collusion infeasible, i.e. we obtain the
same outcome as with a benevolent agency. For lower values of , collusion
becomes protable, i.e. we nd the same outcome as with a nonbenevolent
agency.
Baiman et al. (1991) rule out the screening assumption by modelling
the option to collude as a random event which is not an inherent charac-
teristic of a subject but it is associated with the environment. In Kofman
and Lawarrées (1996) model, the principal is not able to discriminate be-
tween the di¤erent types of auditors because the latter have the same utility
function but di¤erent strategy spaces.24 Following La¤ont (2000, ch. 2),
we suppose that incompleteness of contracts arising from institutional con-
straints prevents Congress from devising an incentive compatible mechanism
which induces the self-selection of regulators according to their type. In other
words, Congress cannot distinguish between the regulators types because
legal arrangements prohibit from making the reward of the agencys sta¤
contingent on some variables that reveal the regulators type.25 Collusion
literature has shown that removing the screening condition implies that Ti-
roles equivalence principle does not apply. Starting from this observation,
we rst derive the conditions which drive the institutional responses to col-
lusion. Then, we show how the playersbargaining powers crucially a¤ect
these conditions.
If Congress decides to prevent collusion through an incentive reward to





= CS (cL) + (1  )CS (cH)   (1 + )V CNB. (20)
In order to get the no-collusion outcome and the associated expected con-
sumer surplus, Congress has to design a bunching mechanism. This scheme
24In Kofman and Lawarrées words, the auditors have no feature that enables the
principal to discriminate between them by means of providing di¤erent incentives. If
the principal were simply to ask for type reports, promising a high reward for dishonest
auditors, every auditor would claim to be dishonest; if he were to threaten punishment for
the dishonest auditors, every auditor would claim to be honest (1996, p. 386).
25For instance, it may be common knowledge that the regulatory sta¤ coming from a
certain region is more likely to collude, but rewards to commissioners cannot be di¤eren-
tiated on the basis of their origins.
19
gives any type of agency the minimum reward to deter collusion TCS = V CNB
in (19). The reward is weighted by the probability  that the rm is e¢ -
cient, since only in this case collusion may emerge (see Proposition 1), and
it is paid by consumers through possibly distortionary taxes which involve a
social cost .
If Congress wants to ght collusion through the shutdown of the ine¢ cient





= CS (cL) . (21)
This policy rules out the threat of collusion, as the cL-type rms interest
in cost manipulation vanishes. However, this occurs at the cost of forgoing
production when the rm is ine¢ cient.






=  [CS (cL) + (1  )CS (cH)] + (1  )CS (cH)
= CS (cH) +  (CS (cL)  CS (cH)) : (22)
Congress expects to receive the consumer surplus CS (cH) arising with
an ine¢ cient rm plus the extra gain in consumer surplus if the agency is
benevolent and the rm is e¢ cient, which occurs with probability .
When designing the optimal response to collusion, Congress compares
costs and benets of any option. We start by comparing the strategy of
deterring the collusion through an incentive reward (option 1 ) with that of
tolerating it cout court (option 3 ). Clearly, the latter outperforms the former
if and only if the cost incurred to induce the agency not to collude outweighs
the expected benet of deterring collusion. This condition is then formally
expounded in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Congress prefers to tolerate collusion rather than deter it through
an incentive payment if and only if the cost of rewarding the agency for








if and only if
(1 + )V CNB  (1  )CSC, (23 )
where CSC  CS (cL)  CS (cH).
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Proof. Compare (20) and (22).
As stressed before, the incentive reward V CNB on the left-hand side of
(23) costs (1 + )V CNB to consumers, since taxes entail a deadweight loss.
The expected consumer loss from collusion CSC on the right-hand side
of (23), which represents the benet of preventing collusion, is weighted by
(1  ), because only the self-interested agency has an incentive to collude.
More importantly, from (10) and (11) the di¤erence between CSC and
 is after some manipulations










Expression (24) shows that the consumer loss from collusion o¤sets the
total stake in collusion. While the impact of side contracting on rms sub-
sidization constitutes a mere transfer of resources between consumers and
rm, the extra gain the rm gets from a higher price is lower than the corre-
sponding consumer loss. In fact, the result in (24) stems from the allocative
ine¢ ciency due to the price distortion above marginal costs. This implies
that collusion does not reduce to a zero-sum game in which the amount of
resources extorted from consumers just forms the total pie which can be
shared between collusive partners, but it shrinks the total gains from trade
and then creates a further distortion in the e¢ cient allocation of resources.
Let us consider now the impact of  on condition (23). As  increases,
the righ-hand side decreases. Hence, a raise in the probability of drawing
a benevolent agency relaxes condition (23) and then allowing collusion is
more attractive. The rationale for this result is obvious. Collusion literature
has emphasized that if the probability of an honest regulator is su¢ ciently
high, costly measures to eliminate collusion may become unnecessary and
the optimal contract may allow collusion in equilibrium.
In this framework, we examine the impact of the agencys bargaining
power  on condition (23). Notice that V CNB and CS
C are both increasing
in . A trade-o¤ emerges between deterring and allowing collusion. On one
hand, a stronger agency ( goes up) can extort a higher bribe from the rm.
Tolerating collusion becomes more attractive since this allows to save the
incentive payment to the agency. On the other hand, the agencys bargaining
power increases the consumer loss from collusion and then it makes deterring
this threat more desirable. From this trade-o¤we get the following Corollary
of Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 Dene   b + (1+)(1 )
(1+)[1 (1+)] , where b is dened in Proposi-
tion 2. Then, if  2 (b; ) Congress prefers to deter collusion through an
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incentive reward rather than tolerate it. If  2 [; 1) allowing collusion is
more desirable.
Proof. Substitute (10) and (19) into (23).
Allowing collusion can be preferred if the interval [; 1) is nonempty,
which occurs if and only




2  cH   cL
   (1 + )

,
where the bracketed expression is positive. This is clearly the case when the
probability of drawing a nonbenevolent agency is low enough. Of course,
collusion not is desirable per se, since consumers would be better o¤ if side
transfers were infeasible, but it can be allowed when it is too costly to ght.
Notice that the parameter  crucially a¤ects the width of the interval (b; )
where preventing collusion is preferable. A higher  makes this option more
attractive. A lower level of corruptibility of the agency ( goes up) increases
the desirability of deterring collusion, because the agency internalizes more
the surplus loss incurred by consumers and asks for a lower incentive re-
ward (V CNB in (19) decreases). Hence, the agencys interests align with
those of Congress, by making collusion less expensive to ght. The same
e¤ect emerges when the shadow cost  increases as side contracting is more
ine¢ cient and then easier to prevent.
We have so far neglected the possibility of shutdown. It is well known
in the literature that Congress may nd it optimal to close up production
when facing an ine¢ cient rm.26 Comparing the strategy of incentivizing the
agency not to collude (option 1 ) with the shutdown policy (option 2 ) yields
the following result.
Lemma 3 Congress prefers to ght collusion through the shutdown of the
ine¢ cient rm rather than through an incentive payment if and only if the
cost of rewarding the agency for not colluding outweighs the loss in consumer








if and only if
 (1 + )V CNB  (1  )CS (cH) . (25 )
Proof. Compare (20) and (21).
The shutdown policy has the benecal e¤ect of saving the incentive re-
ward to the agency but imposes the cost of closing up the production of the
ine¢ cient rm.
We immediately obtain the following result, which represents a Corollary
of Lemma 3.
26See, among others, La¤ont and Martimort (2002).
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Corollary 2 Dene   b + (1 )(1+)[(1 cH)2 2K]
(1+)(2 cH cL)[1 (1+)]c . Then, if  2
(b; ) Congress prefers to deter collusion through an incentive reward rather
than shut down the ine¢ cient rm. If  2 [; 1) shutdown is more desir-
able.
Proof. Substitute (10) and (19) into (25).
We know from (10) and (19) that both CS (cH) and V CNB are increasing
in . Corollary 2 reveals which e¤ect prevails in equilibrium. With a strong
agency, i.e.  2 [; 1), the expected benet of allowing the ine¢ cient rm
to produce is lower than the incentive reward for not colluding, and then
the shutdown is preferable. Notice that the interval [; 1) is increasing in
. A high probability of facing the e¢ cient rm raises the scope for closing
the ine¢ cient rms production, which creates a low consumer surplus in
expected terms. If  ! 1 the shutdown policy is clearly always preferable to
paying an incentive reward to the agency (b ! ), since Congress incurs
no expected costs by excluding the ine¢ cient rm.
Comparing the shutdown policy (option 2 ) with the strategy of allowing
collusion (option 3 ) yields the following result.
Lemma 4 Congress prefers to shut down the ine¢ cient rm rather than
tolerate collusion if the probability of facing the e¢ cient rm is su¢ ciently








if and only if  2 [e; 1), where
e  (1  cH)2   2K
(1  ) (1  cL)2 +  (1  cH)2   2K
2 (0; 1) .
Proof. Compare (21) and (22) using (10).
The shutdown policy is obviously a valuable option only if the rm is
su¢ ciently likely to be e¢ cient.
We are now in a position to summarize our main results.
Proposition 3 With  2 (0;e) the optimal response to collusion exhibits the
following features
 if  2 (b; ) collusion is deterred through an incentive payment to the
agency
 if  2 [; 1) collusion is tolerated tout court,
and Congress never chooses to close up production of the ine¢ cient rm.
With  2 [e; 1) collusion is deterred
 if  2 (b; ) through an incentive payment to the agency
 if  2 [; 1) through the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm,
and tolerating collusion is never optimal.
When  2 (0; b] collusion is never attractive.
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Proposition 3 implies that preventing collusion with an incentive scheme
is a desirable strategy independently of the ex ante distribution of rms
types, as long as the agency is su¢ ciently weak. On the other hand, Congress
views the shutdown policy and the tolerance of collusion as mutually exclusive
alternatives. The latter is a valuable option only if the high probability of
having an ine¢ cient rm, i.e.  2 (0;e), makes the former too costly.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests that policy makers should seriously
care about some important elements of regulatory relationships like players
bargaining powers in order to evaluate the potential for collusion and the
optimal responses to this threat.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined a monopolistic market, where the regulatory
mechanism is not a take-or-leave-it o¤er but the outcome of a bargaining
process between the regulatory agency and the regulated rm. A benevolent
Congress delegates to an agency, which may be either honest or dishonest,
the audit of the rms unknown marginal costs. To this end, the agency
adopts a supervision technology. Furthermore, it carries out the additional
task of negotiating with the rm a regulatory mechanism.
Even though it has been developed in a quite simple model, our analysis
has shown how the bargaining process a¤ects the standard results, which
turn out to be a specic case of our more general approach. In particular
we have focused on the e¤ects of playersbargaining power on equilibrium
values. The regulatory mechanism agreed by the benevolent agency and the
rm maximizes the total gains from trade which are shared between the two
players. The introduction of a negotiation between the regulator and the
monopoly induces a radical change in the collusion stage when the agency
is dishonest. We have showed that the e¢ cient rm nds it protable to
collude only if the agencys bargaining power is high enough. Moreover, the
total gains of collusion are now lower than those the two partners would
appropriate if the agency could make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
In the second part of the paper, we have investigated the optimal organi-
zational responses to the possibility of collusion, in absence of discrimination
between agencys types. We have showed that the playersbargaining pow-
ers crucially a¤ect the optimal response to collusion. In particular, we have
found that preventing collusion through an incentive reward to the agency is
optimal if the agencys bargaining power is low enough, independently of the
ex ante distribution of rms types. With a low probability of the e¢ cient
rm, a stronger agency improves Congresss incentives to tolerate collusion
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in equilibrium as this can be too costly to ght. Otherwise, the shutdown of
the ine¢ cient rm is the best option. This result has implications of some
relevance for the optimal design of regulatory agencies.
We believe that our simple generalization provides useful insights on the
role of the bargaining power in institutions or in organizations. Of course,
this is just a simple step towards more realistic and complex analysis of the
negotiation processes within a hierarchy structure.
Our model may be extended in a variety of directions. The supervisory
technology may be modied in order to consider the possibility of imperfect
monitoring, which implies that the signal received by the agency may be
wrong or uninformative. This would allow to study the bargaining process
between the agency and the rm under asymmetric information. Another
possibility is to extend the model by introducing the agencys e¤ort to audit,
since in practice the regulator can a¤ect the functioning of the supervisory
technology and moral hazard turns out to be an important issue.
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